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NOTES
The Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in Reduction·
in-Force Cases
Jessica Lind
INTRODUCTION

The Friends Corporation, a distributor of fine coffees, decided
to eliminate part of its sales force following a slow-down in its sales.
Monica, a 59-year-old saleswoman, had been employed by Friends
for 12 years, while Rachel, a 24-year-old with similar job responsibilities, had begun working for Friends only 18 months ago. Both
Monica and Rachel had received favorable reviews from their
supervisor during their most recent evaluations. As part of its
reduction-in-force, Friends's management chose to discharge
Monica and to retain Rachel. Monica filed suit against Friends for
age discrimination. What evidence must Monica present in order to
meet her prima facie burden?
In 1973, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green1 created a three-part burden-shifting framework for resolving intentional discrimination suits brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The first part of the framework requires
the employee-plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, which consists
of four elements. The plaintiff must show that she belongs to a protected group,3 that she applied and was qualified for an open position, that the employer rejected her application, and that the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's
qualifications. 4 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing her prima
facie case, an inference of discrimination arises, and the burden of
production shifts to the employer-defendant to come forward with
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.5 At the third
stage, the plaintiff has a final opportunity to demonstrate that discriminatory animus, rather than the employer's proffered explanation, motivated the employer's actions. 6
1. 411 u.s. 792 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
3. Title VII recognizes race, ethnic, gender, religious, and national origin distinctions. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
4. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
5. See 411 U.S. at 802.
6. See 411 U.S. at 804.
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Although originally proposed for cases involving discriminatory
hiring practices,7 the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case has been
modified to fit other contexts. For example, where the employer
has fired the plaintiff and hired a replacement, courts have modified
the second and fourth prongs of the prima facie case, requiring that
the plaintiff demonstrate that she was qualified for the position she
formerly held and that the employer replaced her with an individual
outside the protected class.s
The McDonnell Douglas framework subsequently has been applied to claims brought under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act9 (ADEA). 10 Application of the framework to reductionin-force (RIF) cases brought under the ADEA11 has proven problematic given the particular circumstances of the RIF.12 A typical
RIF case arises when an employer restructures its workforce, eliminating one or more job positions.B Because the employer fires the
plaintiff after eliminating her position, the plaintiff cannot show
that the employer replaced her with an individual outside the protected class with the plaintiff's qualifications - the fourth prong of
7. See 411 U.S. at 792.
8. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1983).
9. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); Loeb v. Textron,
600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
11. The vast majority of RIF cases are brought under the ADEA. The arguments
presented in this Note, however, apply equally as well to RIF cases brought under Title VII.
12. In some RIF employment discrimination cases, the courts focus their inquiry on
whether a RIF actually occurred or whether the employer has claimed falsely a RIF in order
to conceal age discrimination. See, e.g., Hardin v. Russman Corp., 45 F.3d 262, 265 (8th Cir.
1995) (concluding that a RIF did in fact occur); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448,456 (7th
Cir. 1988) (treating the employer's structural reorganization as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination). The scope of this Note, however, is limited to
cases where the parties do not dispute the RIF itself but dispute why, given the RIF, the
employer discharged the plaintiff rather than a younger employee. In this context, courts
should not consider the RIF the employer's proffered reason, as some courts have done, but
should require employers to explain why it chose to discharge the plaintiff. Compare Barnes
v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457,1464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 {1990) (stating that
the most common proffered reason for the discharge is the RIF) with Thombrough v.
Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The question is why, given
the employer's need to reduce his workforce, he chose to discharge the older rather than the
younger employee.").
13. See Robert G. Boehmer, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act - Reductions
in Force as America Grays, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 379, 383 {1990). There are two distinct scenarios
under which a RIF case arises, although both follow a restructuring of the workforce. Under
the first scenario, the employer eliminates the plaintiff's job position. Under the second
scenario, the employer eliminates a job position other than the plaintiff's position. Rather
than lay off the displaced worker who formerly held the eliminated position, however, the
employer instead lays off the plaintiff, replacing her with the displaced employee. In other
words, the displaced employee "bumps" the plaintiff. This Note focuses on the former
scenario, which has proven problematic for the courts at the prima facie stage. Courts properly may evaluate the latter scenario under the McDonnell Douglas framework as applied to
the firing context. Hereinafter, I use the term "RIF cases" to refer only to those cases where
the employer eliminated the plaintiff's position.

Michigan Law Review

834

[Vol. 94:832

the prima facie case. Consequently, courts have tried to modify the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in order to reflect the particular circumstances of a RIF, but they have not done so in a consistent manner. Some courts ask only that the plaintiff show that the
employer retained a younger employee in a position similar to that
formerly held by the plaintiff.14 Other courts employ a flexible
fourth element that requires the laid-off worker to present evidence
"from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate" without specifying what form that
evidence must take.ls
This Note proposes that courts require the plaintiff in a RIF
case to show, as part of her prima facie burden, that the employer
reassigned at least part of her job responsibilities to a younger individual of equal or lesser qualifications. Part I describes the analytical framework applied to most intentional discrimination cases the McDonnell Douglas framework. Part II explains that the RIF
plaintiff cannot meet the specific requirements of the prima facie
case as articulated in McDonnell Douglas because her firing occurs
in conjunction with the elimination of her position. This Part then
examines two approaches taken by the courts with respect to the
prima facie case in the RIF context and concludes that neither approach achieves the primary goal of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case: prospectively refuting the most common legitimate explanations for the employer's conduct. Part III recommends that
courts adopt a prima facie case that requires a RIF plaintiff to
demonstrate that she possesses equivalent objective qualifications
to the retained, younger employee(s) and that her employer did not
eliminate completely her job responsibilities but only her position.
Together, these elements are sufficient to support an inference of
employment discrimination in the RIF context.
I. THE

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES

Because the ADEA grew out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act16 and because much of the language in the ADEA par14. See, e.g, Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1098 (1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); see also Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.
1990); Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1457; Thornbrough, 160 F.2d at 633; Selby v. Pepsico, 784 F. Supp.
750 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993).
16. Section 715 of Title VII called on the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study of age
discrimination. The Secretary's 1965 report concluded that age discrimination in the
workplace was a serious problem that required congressional action. Congress agreed, and
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allels that of Title vn, courts have transferred to the ·ADEA context the standards and methods of proof developed under Title VII
employment discrimination claimsP Thus, any evaluation of
ADEA disparate treatment claims requires an initial examination
of Title VII employment discrimination cases, the most important
being McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 1B
Under Title Vll and the ADEA, a plaintiff who alleges that her
employer intentionally discriminated against her may present either'
direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder can infer intentional discrimination.19 Evaluation of direct evidence does not pose much difficulty
the ADEA became effective on June 12, 1968. SECRETARY OF LABoR, NEXT STEPS IN CoMBATING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, 95TH CONG., 1sT SESS. (Comm. Print 1977).
17. See Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); Loeb v. Textron, 600
F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979).
Plaintiffs can prove employment discrimination under two distinct legal theories - "disparate treatment" or "disparate impact." A plaintiff who brings her claim under the disparate treatment theory must demonstrate that her employer intentionally treated her less
favorably than others because of her race, gender, religion, national origin, or age. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The disparate
impact theory addresses employment practices that are facially neutral but allegedly affect
members of a protected class more harshly than those outside the protected class. In this
context, plaintiffs also must show that the employment practice cannot be justified by business necessity. The disparate impact theory does not require proof of discriminatory motive.
See 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; see also Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 117. Although ADEA cases can be
brought under either one of these two theories, this Note focuses only on disparate treatment
claims in the context of RIF cases.
Some courts have held that the ADEA does not recognize disparate impact claims. Compare DiBiase v. Smith Line Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995) (doubting whether the
disparate impact theory is available under the AD EA in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)) with Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d
953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (assuming that disparate impact liability applies under the
ADEA) and Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (same). For commentators favoring extension of disparate impact liability to cases brought under the ADEA, see
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229 (1990); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 715
(1990); Marla Ziegler, Comment, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038 (1984). For commentators opposed to the extension
of disparate impact liability to cases brought under the ADEA, see Donald R. Stacy, A Case
Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437
(1985); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REv. 837 (1982). See generally Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the
Age Discrimination Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. REv.
507 (concluding that the Court is unlikely to extend disparate impact liability to cases
brought under the ADEA).
18. 411
792 (1973).
19. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3
(1983). "Direct evidence" refers to evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue. In
other words, if a factfinder finds the direct evidence trustworthy, the evidence proves the
existence of a fact without any inference or presumption. For example, in an age discrimination case where 59-year-old Monica loses her job, a statement by Monica's boss to the effect
"we should fire Monica because she is too old for this type of work" would prove discriminatory animus if believed. In contrast, circumstantial evidence, even if believed, requires additional reasoning before the factfinder can believe the proposition for which the evidence is

u.s.
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for the courts. The vast majority of Title VII and ADEA cases,
however, do not involve direct evidence of discrimination because
plaintiffs rarely come to court with the "smoking gun" in hand.2 o
Plaintiffs instead tend to rely on circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established guidelines for evaluating circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination. In deciding McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set
forth a three-stage analytical framework for the evaluation of employment discrimination claims. The plaintiff always retains the ultimate burden of persuading the court that discrimination
motivated the defendant's employment decision,21 but the burden
of production shifts between the plaintiff and the defendant in order "to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question."22 This Part briefly describes each of the
three stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
A.

The Prima Facie Case

The plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case. In
McDonnell Douglas, the Court identified four specific conditions
that comprise a prima facie case of racially discriminatory hiring
practices:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.2 3
offered. The truthfulness of circumstantial evidence tends to suggest the existence of some
fact, but it does not prove the fact conclusively. To believe the fact for which the circumstantial evidence is offered, the factfinder must make a leap in logic, such as an inference or
presumption. In our age discrimination example, testimony from other older co-workers of
Monica that they, too, felt discriminated against lends credence to Monica's claim if believed,
but the fact that Monica's employer discriminated against Monica's co-workers does not conclusively prove that the employer discriminated against Monica. See generally McCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE §§ 185, 338 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
20. See, e.g., Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80,85 {2d Cir. 1990) (stating
that, because employers rarely leave a paper trail or smoking gun indicating a discriminatory
intent, plaintiffs often must build their employment discrimination cases from circumstantial
evidence which undercuts the employer's proffered explanation); see also Holzman v.
Jaymar-Ruby, 916 F.2d 1298, 1303 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no smoking gun in a
typical age discrimination case); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43,48 (3d
Cir. 1989) (same).
21. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 {1981).
22. 450 U.S. at 253.
23. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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Satisfaction of these four elements gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.z4
The Supreme Court made clear in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine25 that it intended for the prima facie case to
include "circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination."26 If there exists little connection between the
prima facie case and the presumption of discrimination, the risk
that the employer must defend itself against a frivolous claim increases.27 The second and fourth elements support an inference of
discrimination by eliminating the two most common nondiscriminatory reasons offered by employers in defense of their actions28 the plaintiff's "lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in
the job sought."29 The second element of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case therefore requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
she was qualified for the job sought,3° and the fourth element requires evidence showing that the employer continued to solicit applicants for the position.31 Elimination of these explanations for
24. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7; Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760
F.2d 633, 641 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas approach, if the plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the prima facie case, the factfinder must infer, in the absence
of rebuttal evidence, the truth of the alleged discrimination. This should be distinguished
from the more general prima facie case required to avoid summary judgment or a directed
verdict, where the plaintiff need only produce evidence sufficiently probative of the issue in
dispute so as to permit the trier of fact to find for the plaintiff. See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, §§ 338, 342. In other words, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in
this second, less stringent sense when a reasonable jury may infer from the evidence, if it so
chooses, that the alleged fact is true.
25. 450 u.s. 248 (1981).
26. 450 U.S. at 253.
27. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1213 (1982).
28. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
29. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,358 n.44 (1977). The
first and third elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case satisfy the statutory
standing requirements of Title VII - that the plaintiff belong to the protected class and that
she have suffered a harm.
30. "Qualified" may have two different meanings: it may mean simply the minimum objective credentials or skills necessary for a particular position; or it may also encompass subjective qualifications, such as "leadership" and "likability." The Supreme Court has not
explicitly chosen between these two alternatives with respect to the prima facie case in the
employment discrimination context. For a discussion of which meaning courts should adopt
at the prima facie stage in RIF cases, see infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
31. It may be debated whether satisfaction of the second and fourth elements supports an
inference of discrimination strong enough to support a mandatory presumption of discrimination. Compare St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 (1993) (Scalia, J.)
("[W]hat is required to establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less
than what a directed verdict demands.") with Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that proof of the prima facie case implies discrimination and raises not only an inference of discrimination but also creates a mandatory presumption in favor of the plaintiff). At
a minimum, however, satisfaction of these elements identifies a plaintiff's case as one in
which the factfinder reasonably might infer that discrimination underlies the employer's actions. See also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
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the employer's actions increases the probability that a discriminatory motive lay behind the employer's actions. As the Supreme
Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters:3 2
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because
we know from our experience that more often than not people do not
act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.33

Consequently, the courts require the plaintiff to present evidence at
the prima facie stage which directly bears on the two most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's actions.
In recognition of the varying factual scenarios among employment discrimination cases, the Court stated that all the elements of
the prima facie case as prescribed in McDonnell Douglas need not
be applied uniformly in every type of case.34 Accordingly, the
courts have adapted the four elements as circumstances require.3s
B.

The Employer's Burden

Once established, the prima facie case gives rise to a mandatory
presumption36 that discriminatory reasons motivated the employer's actions.37 The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence rebutting the presumption of
MICH. L REv. 2229, 2243-54 (1995) (concluding that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case does no more than identify the plaintiff's claim as one in which discrimination may have
occurred).
32. 438 u.s. 567 (1978).
33. 438 U.S. at 577 (citations omitted).
34. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
35. For example, where the employer has fired the plaintiff and hired a replacement,
courts have modified the second and fourth prongs of the prima facie case, requiring that the
plaintiff demonstrate that she was qualified for the position she formerly held and that the
employer replaced her with an individual outside the protected class. See, e.g., Blackwell v.
Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1983).
36. While most presumptions rest on considerations of probability, see generally McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 343, sometimes courts create a presumption when the
opposing party has superior access to the relevant proof. As the decisionmaker, the employer can explain best why it retained an employee younger than the plaintiff. See Clara B.
Bums, Comment, The Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination in Reduction-In-Force Layoffs: A Flexible Standard, 20 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 841, 857 (1989). Thus, in the employment
discrimination context, some commentators justify the presumption on the ground that it is
necessary to shift the burden of production to the employer. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at
1216. Although this argument may have proved persuasive in 1993, the recent liberalization
of discovery rules renders the argument significantly less convincing because the employer
can be forced to state the reason underlying its actions through the use of interrogatories or
requests for admissions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See generally Malamud, supra note 31, at
2269-74.
37. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981}.
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discrimination raised by the prima facie case.38 Specifically, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions.39 The defendant need not prove that its articulated reason
actually motivated its actions; rather, the defendant need only raise
a genuine issue of fact as to whether its proffered reason or a discriminatory one motivated its employment decision. Once the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination raised
by the prima facie case drops out.4 o If the employer fails to meet its
burden of proof, the presumption remains, and the court will enter
summary judgment or a directed verdict for the plaintiff.41
C.

The Pretext Stage

After the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions, the focus shifts to the third and final stage of
the analysis - the pretext stage.42 The plaintiff now has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason was not
the true basis for its decision. To meet this burden, the employee
either may present evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or may attack directly
the employer's proffered reason by presenting evidence that raises
doubt as to the truth of the employer's explanation.43 Although the
presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case
has been dropped at this point, the factfinder still may consider the
evidence used to establish the prima facie case in determining
whether the plaintiff can meet her ultimate burden of proof.44

38. See 450 U.S. at 254.
39. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7W., 802 (1973).
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
41. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
43. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2754 (1993), the Supreme Court held that disproof of the employer's proffered reason does
not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. In interpreting Hicks, courts have
split over how high a burden the plaintiff now carries. Some courts have held that although
disproof of the employer's proffered reason does not entitle the plaintiff to judgment in her
favor, it does give rise to a permissible inference of discrimination. See, e.g., United States v.
McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir.1994); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.
1993); Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 1993). In contrast, other courts have held
that a showing of pretext in the absence of additional evidence of discrimination is never
sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
44. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.lO.
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CuRRENT APPLICATIONS oF THE McDoNNELL DouGLAS
PRIMA FACIE CASE TO RIF CASES

The realities of a RIF render strict application of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case impractical. Laid-off employees whose
job positions have been eliminated cannot possibly show that their
employer replaced them4s or sought applicants for a now nonexistent position, as required by the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case. Nevertheless, an employer still can engage in age discrimination when reducing its workforce. Employers
who consider age when determining whom to lay off violate the
ADEA.46 Thus, the replacement requirement affords no protection
against age discrimination in the RIF scenario,47 rendering the
ADEA incapable of providing remedies for subtle forms of discrimination. Most courts recognize this reality and wisely have chosen
not to require ADEA plaintiffs to show that they were replaced by
a younger employee following a RIF.4S
In eliminating the replacement element, the courts are left with
the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case,
which alone do not support an inference of discrimination.49 Unfortunately, courts have not been consistent in determining what
additional showing is necessary to support an inference of age discrimination in RIF cases. Section II.A examines the Coburnso approach, which simply requires that the employer have retained a
younger employee whose job responsibilities parallel those previously held by the plaintiff, and argues that it fails to support an
inference of age discrimination. Section II.B evaluates the
Williams51 approach, which modifies the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case so as generally to require evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, and argues that
45. The Sixth Circuit defined "replacement" as "when another employee is hired or reassigned to perform the plaintiff's duties." However, "a person is not replaced when another
employee is assigned to perform the plaintiff's duties in addition to other duties [already
being performed], or when the work is redistributed among other existing employees already
performing related work." Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); see also Kesselring v. United Technologies Corp., 753 F. Supp.
1359, 1364 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (quoting Barnes).
46. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994).
47. See McCuen v. Homes Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1150, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Courts properly may require a RIF plaintiff to show replacement when the plaintiff
challenges whether a RIF actually occurred. If the employer sought a replacement for the
plaintiff, the employer clearly did not eliminate the plaintiff's position. Under such circumstances, the employer's explanation for the plaintiff's discharge - the RIF - may be
pretextual, an attempt to cover up a discriminatory reason for the discharge.
49. See Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1988).
50. See Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 u.s. 994 (1983).
51. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
u.s. 943 (1982).
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this approach raises several procedural difficulties which confuse
the analysis of the plaintiff's claim.
A. The Coburn Prima Facie Case
This Section examines one approach to the prima facie case in
RIF cases, first espoused by the D.C. Circuit in Coburn v. Pan
American World Airways, 52 and concludes that it is not an adequate
reformulation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because
it cannot support an inference of age discrimination. The Coburn
prima facie case simply requires RIF plaintiffs to show that a similarly situated younger employee53 was treated more favorably than
the plaintiff.54 Plaintiffs often meet this requirement by showing
that the employer dismissed the plaintiff while retaining one or
more younger employee(s) in a position similar to that formerly
held by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that they were
more qualified than the younger employee(s) but must show only
that they were qualified for the positions they formerly held.55
Courts following the Coburn approach justify their position by
pointing to the Supreme Court's dictum that "[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. "56
One also could argue that the replacement element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case serves the purpose of demonstrating inherently "suspicious circumstances" which give rise to an
inference of discriminatory animus57 and that requiring plaintiffs to
show retention of a younger employee serves a parallel purpose in
the RIF context.5 B Neither justification for a low-burden prima facie case is persuasive.
The Coburn prima facie case does not function adequately as a
preemptive strike against the employer's most common proffered
52. 711 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
53. A retained employee is "similarly situated" to the plaintiff if her job responsibilities
resembled those performed by the plaintiff and if her position required similar qualifications
and afforded the same status as that held by the plaintiff. Cf. Hill v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
729 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that the plaintiff must show that those
retained were similarly situated in terms of qualifications and position).
54. See Coburn, 711 F.2d at 342; see also Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d
893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
55. See Coburn, 711 F.2d at 343; see also Healy, 860 F.2d at 1214; Chipollin~ 814 F.2d at
897; Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
937 (1983).
56. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). For example,
the Third Circuit in Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co. held that the prima facie case is
easily made out because the focus of age discrimination cases centers on the defendant's
articulated business reasons for its actions and the plaintiff's evidence of pretext. See Healy,
860 F.2d at 1214; see also Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118.
57. See Boehmer, supra note 13, at 400.
58. See id. at 430.
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legitimate reasons for its conduct because it does not establish that
the plaintiff was at least as qualified as the retained younger employee(s).s9 In the RIF scenario, employers commonly justify their
dismissal of an older plaintiff by explaining that the plaintiff was
less qualified than the retained younger employee.6o Simply requiring plaintiffs to show more favorable treatment of a younger employee does not refute prospectively the possibility that the
employer believed the younger employee was more qualified than
the plaintiff. Consequently, under the Coburn approach, an employer who properly focused on the relative qualifications of the
employees when deciding whom to discharge during a RIF nevertheless may be presumed to have discriminated against the
plaintiff.61
In addition, the Coburn prima facie case fails as a modification
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because it does not support an inference of discrimination. Although the burden of establishing a prima facie case should not be onerous, the burden must
be high enough to support an inference of discrimination in order
to protect employers from having to defend themselves against frivolous claims.62 In the RIF context, the suspicion aroused when an
employer discharges an older worker instead of a younger worker is
not strong enough to support an inference of discrimination.63 Unlike non-RIF cases, where courts assume that an employer does not
fire qualified employees, discharges pursuant to a RIF are not inherently suspicious in light of the employer's economic circumstances. Nor should the retention of younger employees be
inherently suspicious. Because employers almost invariably retain
some younger employees in a workforce reduction, especially in a
large-scale reorganization, this fact itself is not suggestive of age
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33 (explaining that the prima facie case serves
as a preemptive strike against the employer's most common proffered legitimate reasons for
its conduct).
60. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting that plaintiffs were discharged upon a determination that they were the least effective
employees in their department); Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633,
646 (5th Cir. 1985) (referring to employer's claim that the plaintiff was a less effective worker
than retained employees); LaGrant v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir.
1984) (describing a supervisor's testimony that a younger employee was retained over plaintiff upon a determination that the younger employee had higher performance evaluations).
61. To raise a presumption against an employer who focused on relative qualifications
defeats the explicit purpose of the ADEA - "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age." 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1994).
62. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
63. See Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1167 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that the fact
that a younger employer assumed plaintiff's duties was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case). But see Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting the district court's conclusion that retention of a younger employee does not support
an inference of discrimination), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
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discrimination.64 Other highly plausible explanations may account
for the retention of the younger employee over the older one, such
as superior qualifications, personality, or higher seniority. In the
absence of additional evidence, the factfinder cannot determine
whether a discriminatory motive is a highly probable explanation
for the retention of a younger employee. Therefore, a presumption
of age discrimination is inappropriate when the plaintiff shows only
that the employer retained a younger, similarly situated
employee.65
B.

The Williams Approach

Rather than require the RIF plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer chose to retain a similarly situated younger employee, the
Fifth Circuit in Williams v. General Motors Corp. 66 adopted a more
flexible approach in reformulating the prima facie case in the context of a RIF. The Fifth Circuit held that in order to establish a
prima facie case, the RIF plaintiff need only produce "evidence,
circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably
conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the
decision at issue."67 This requirement simply asks the plaintiff to
produce evidence sufficient to support an inference that the employer did not treat age neutrally, as required by the ADEA.68
Once the plaintiff meets this requirement, the court proceeds to
stage two and, if necessary, to stage three of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Several courts have followed the Williams
64. See Thombrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 644 (5th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the discharge of qualified, older workers pursuant to a RIF is not inherently
suspicious because unlike ordinary discharge cases, where the discharge of a qualified worker
raises suspicion because courts assume employers simply do not fire qualified employees, the
discharge in a RIF case readily can be explained in terms of the employer's economic situation); see also Bums, supra note 36, at 856 (stating that the mere fact of discharge of a qualified employee pursuant to a RIF does not create an inference of discrimination because the
employer must discharge certain qualified individuals while retaining other qualified
individuals).
65. Public policy also argues against a low burden prima facie case in the RIF context.
An easily established prima facie case invites laid-off employees to file suit whenever the
employer retains a younger employee, regardless of whether the plaintiff can provide any
additional evidence of discrimination. This result in tum may induce employers to lay off
younger, more qualified employees instead of older workers in order to avoid litigation. See
Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 647 ("[A]llowing an employee to bring suit merely because an
employer fires him rather than a younger, allegedly less well-qualified employee ... may, to
some degree, induce employers to lay off younger employees instead of older ones."). This
practice undermines the ADEA's prohibition against consideration of an individual's age in
its employment decisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
66. 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
67. 656 F.2d at 129. The plaintiff also must establish that she is a member of the protected class, has been discharged or demoted, and was qualified to assume another position
at the time of the discharge or demotion. See 656 F.2d at 129.
68. See 656 F.2d at 130.
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holding. 69 Unfortunately, the Williams approach causes several
procedural problems because it effectively collapses the pretext
stage into the prima facie case.
For many plaintiffs, the only evidence they can offer to demonstrate that the employer relied upon age in making its decision is
"pretext" evidence. "Pretext" evidence takes two forms. The first
asserts the fallacy of the employer's proffered reason for dismissing
the plaintiff rather than the younger employee. The second demonstrates the employer's general tendency to discriminate against
older workers, such as statistics that indicate an age disparity in the
employer's decisions, off-hand remarks that disparage older workers, or age-biased treatment of co-workers in the protected class.7o
Under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, pretextual
evidence is immaterial if the plaintiff fails to eliminate prospectively
the most commonly proffered reasons for the adverse employment
decision.71 However, under the Williams formulation, the plaintiff
may introduce pretextual evidence in support of the initial inference of discrimination. For example, in Stumph v. Thomas &
Skinner, Inc., 72 the 55-year-old plaintiff met his prima facie burden
by introducing a statement by the company chairman that the company wished to eliminate its older workforce and by presenting affidavits from two older employees who voluntarily retired only after
they experienced age animus from the defendant-employer.73
In effect, the approach of the Williams court elevates the pretext
stage to the prima facie stage if the plaintiff chooses to present
pretextual evidence in meeting her prima facie burden.74 This approach, however, causes confusion by leaving unanswered several
69. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-84 (11th Cir. 1990);
Stumph v. Thomas & Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 95-97 (7th Cir. 1985); Thornbrough, 760 F.2d
at 641-45.
70. See Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 644 F. Supp. 906, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating
that pretext evidence can take two forms: "1. through statements or other evidence expressing an employer's discriminatory animus, notwithstanding any reasons the employer has articulated, or 2. through evidence otherwise undercutting the credibility of the employer's
proffered reasons"). Although evidence demonstrating general age animus on the part of the
employer does not relate directly to the specific employment decision affecting the plaintiff, it
does increase the likelihood that age animus underlay the specific decision at issue.
71. See Malamud, supra note 31, at 2290, 2298-99; see also Selby v. Pepsico, Inc., 784 F.
Supp. 750, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that evidence which indicates that the employer's
explanation for laying off the plaintiff rather than a younger employee is not the true reason
for its actions properly cannot be considered by the court until after the plaintiff has established the prima facie case), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993).
72. 770 F2d 93 (7th Cir. 1985).
73. See Stumph, 170 F2d at 97; see also Hardin v. Hussman Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir.
1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because there remained a material
issue of fact regarding whether the employer's stated reasons for dismissal were pretextual).
74. See Frank J. Cavaliere, The Recent "Respectability" of Summary Judgment and Directed Verdicts in Intentional Age Discrimination Cases: ADEA Analysis Through the
Supreme Court's Summary Judgment "Prism," 41 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 103 (1993).
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procedural questions. In elevating the pretext analysis to the prima
facie stage should the court consider all pretextual evidence at the
prima facie stage or just enough to support an inference of discrimination, leaving the larger pretextual analysis for stage three? In regard to the allocation of proof, should the burden of production still
shift to the defendant once the plaintiff presents enough evidence
to support an inference of discrimination or is such a shift justified
only when the plaintiff eliminates the most common proffered reasons for the adverse employment action? If the burden of production does shift to the defendant, what specifically must the
defendant show if the plaintiff has disproved already the employer's
proffered reason for dismissing the plaintiff at the prima facie
stage? 75
Moreover, the Williams approach ignores the fact that in structuring the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Supreme Court limited consideration of pretextual evidence to the third stage of the
analysis, after the plaintiff already has established a prima facie
case. In collapsing these stages, Williams ignores the Court's carefully crafted procedural framework for employment discrimination
cases.76 To help courts avoid this confused analysis, Part III proposes a more logical and coherent approach that adheres to the
function served by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case - raising an inference of discrimination by prospectively rebutting the
two most common, nondiscriminatory explanations for an employer's discharge of the plaintiff.
III.

REcoMMENDED REFORMULATION OF THE McDoNNELL
DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE CASE

This Part argues that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
should be reformulated in the RIP context to require a plaintiff to
show the following: 1) she is a member of the protected class; 2)
she was terminated pursuant to a RIP; 3) her duties were reassigned
to a younger, similarly situated employee;77 and 4) that the younger
employee was less qualified than the plaintiff. The first two requirements simply meet the standing requirements of the ADEA
75. For example, in Hardin, the plaintiff raised an inference of discrimination by presenting evidence which suggested that the employer's proffered reason for his termination - that
plaintiff had one of the two worst performance records in the department - was pretextual.
Hardin, 45 F.3d at 265-66. Assuming the plaintiff presented such evidence as part of his
prima facie case, can the employer meet its burden of production at stage two by again stating that the plaintiff was dismissed because he possessed an inferior performance record or
must the employer come forward with some other explanation or can the employer meet its
burden by attacking the plaintiff's pretextual evidence?
76. Cf. Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
the coUapse of the third stage into a single stage "would defeat the purpose underlying the
McDonnell Douglas process").
77. For a definition of "similarly situated employee," see supra note 53.
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- that the plaintiff is covered by the ADEA and has suffered a
harm. The third and fourth requirements follow the principles of
McDonnell Douglas by prospectively refuting the most common legitimate reasons for the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff78 and by requiring the plaintiff to come forward with evidence
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.79
A. Reassignment Element

The requirement that plaintiffs show reassignment80 of their
work responsibilities parallels the fourth prong of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case - that plaintiffs show that their employer
either replaced them or continued to accept applications for the position. In the hiring-firing context, the fourth prong serves the purpose of rebutting an employer's claim that it eliminated the position
for which the plaintiff applied or which the plaintiff previously held,
a commonly offered, legitimate explanation for the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff.81 Evidence of replacement or the
acceptance of employment applications demonstrates the employer's continued need for the work previously performed by the
plaintiff. In the RIF context, reassignment of the plaintiff's responsibilities to others serves the same function. When the employer
reassigns the plaintiff's responsibilities, the ultimate question remains unanswered - why did the employer discharge the plaintiff
rather than one of the employees who assumed the plaintiff's responsibilities? In contrast, the complete elimination of the duties
previously performed by the plaintiff suggests that business necessity required the discharge of the plaintiff, thereby explaining why
the employer chose to lay off the plaintiff rather than another
employee.82
78. See supra section I.A for a discussion of why the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
supports a presumption against the employer.
79. In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), the
Supreme Court made clear that at a minimum, the prima facie case must identify "circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."
80. "Reassignment" occurs either when the employer reassigns some or all of the plaintiff's responsibilities to another employee who previously did not hold these responsibilities
or when the employer eliminates the plaintiff's position but retains another employee who
was assigned duties similar to those performed by the plaintiff before the RIF.
81. Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)
(stating that one of the most commonly offered reasons relied upon by the employer includes
"the absence of a vacancy in the job sought").
82. Some plaintiffs may argue that the employer made a bad business decision in deciding
to eliminate the plaintiff's job. See Selby v. Pepsico, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 750, 756 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the employer should have reduced its workforce
through attrition and not by firing the plaintiff), affd., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1993). However,
Congress did not intend for the ADEA to protect employees against their employer's bad
employment decisions. See Jorgensen v. Modem Women of Am., 761 F.2d 502, 505 (8th Cir.
1985) ("The ADEA is not intended to be used as a means of reviewing the propriety of a
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The reassignment element also requires the plaintiff to show
that her work responsibilities were reassigned to a younger employee.s3 This requirement parallels the fourth element of the
prima facie case of most hiring-firing cases - that the employer
replaced the plaintiff with an individual outside the protected
class.84 An employer who replaces the plaintiff with an individual
who is also a member of the protected class dispels any possible
inference of discrimination. For example, an employer who replaces a fired female employee with another woman in all likelihood did not harbor discriminatory animus against the fired
employee on account of her gender. Similarly, an employer who
reassigns an older employee's responsibilities to another older employee probably did not discharge the older worker on account of
her age.
B. Relative Qualification Element
This section explains why courts should examine the plaintiff's
relative qualifications as part of the prima facie case in ADEA
cases arising out of a RIF. Section lll.B.l argues that an inference
of age discrimination arises in the RIF context only after the plaintiff demonstrates that she was at least as qualified as the employee
retained by the employer. Section lll.B.2 explains why the assessment of relative qualifications should focus only on objective criteria at the prima facie stage, ignoring subjective criteria.
1. Advantages of Assessing Relative Qualifications
Requiring the plaintiff in a RIF case to present evidence comparing her qualifications to those of the retained employee(s) parallels the second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
- evidence that the plaintiff possessed the necessary qualifications
for the position. In non-RIF cases, courts require the plaintiff to
business decision on the part of [the employer]."). Instead, the ADEA only requires that the
employment decision be based on factors other than age.
83. Rather than require plaintiffs to show reassignment, courts simply could ask that the
plaintiff demonstrate more favorable treatment of a younger employee in a position for
which the plaintiff was qualified. Specifically, courts could require that employers who have
eliminated positions transfer affected employees to other positions in the corporation for
which they are qualified, even if this entails "bumping" the less qualified or less senior employees currently in these positions. See Boehmer, supra note 13, at 429 (stating that the
ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima facie case where the employer fails to "bump other
employees"). Although the employer's failure to bump younger employees may suggest
preferential treatment, most courts have not treated the absence of a bumping policy as discrimination. See, e.g., Earley v. Champion Inti. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir. 1990);
Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990);
Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
84. Where the employer has not yet replaced the plaintiff, it is sufficient that the plaintiff
show that the employer continued to accept applications for the position from persons
outside the protected class.
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show that she was qualified for the position because such evidence
prospectively rebuts an employer's claim that the plaintiff lacked
the necessary qualifications for the position, thereby increasing the
likelihood that a discriminatory motive underlay the employer's actions. In the RIF context, because presumably all employees are
qualified, employers commonly justify their discharge of the plaintiff not by arguing that the plaintiff was unqualified but by pointing
to the younger employee's superior qualifications.ss Therefore, in
anticipation of this explanation, evidence that the plaintiff is at least
as qualified as the retained employee(s) is necessary to support an
inference of discrimination and justify a mandatory presumption of
age discrimination.s6
In addition, the relative qualification element protects an employer from exposure to age discrimination claims every time it
reduces the size of its workforce. Because employers almost invariably retain a younger employee during a RIF, a prima facie standard that requires only that the plaintiff show retention of a
younger employee invites litigation every time an employer lays off
an older worker. This result in turn may cause employers to retain
older workers over younger, more qualified workers in an attempt
to avoid litigation.87 By increasing the burden placed on plaintiffs
in establishing a prima facie case, the relative qualification prong
lowers the likelihood that discharged employees will bring suit
without adequate evidence supporting their claims of discrimination. Consequently, employers will not be exposed to litigation
every time they lay off an older worker due to a RIF. Employers

85. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466 (stating that one of "the most obvious explanations for
the discharge of any one employee [is] lower proficiency").
86. However, where an employer was unaware of the plaintiff's inferior qualifications,
courts should allow the plaintiff to satisfy her prima facie burden if the evidence suggests that
the employer may have relied upon age in making its decision. For example, in Hardin v.
Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff, a 51-year-old research engineer
who was terminated pursuant to a RIF, never proved that he was more qualified than similarly situated younger employees who were retained by the employer. Although the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had a performance record worse than the retained employees,
the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The individual responsible for determining who among the 54 employees in the plaintiff's department would be
terminated met with his immediate subordinate for only 30 minutes, failed to consult the
plaintiff's immediate supervisor, and did not review any employee personnel records. Suspicious of the method in which the termination decision was made, the court determined that
the plaintiff raised a material issue of fact with regard to whether the employer impermissibly
relied on age in terminating the plaintiff. See 45 F.3d at 265-66.
87. Cf. Alisa D. Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title
VII Litigation, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 553, 564 (1982) (stating that employers may favor lessqualified minority individuals in order to avoid litigation if the prima facie case requires only
that the plaintiff was qualified, rather than equally or more qualified than the nonminority
individual).
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then may focus on the relative qualifications of their employees,
thereby realizing the purpose of the ADEA.ss
2. Objective Comparison
Although under Burdine the specific elements of the prima facie
case must include "circumstances which give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination,"89 this objective must be balanced against
the Court's additional instruction that the plaintiff's prima facie
burden not be onerous.9° Courts can balance Burdine's competing
objectives effectively by requiring proof of relative objective qualifications only, ignoring subjective qualifications until the pretext
stage.
When assessment of a given trait can lead to only one conclusion, such a trait is called an objective qualification. For example,
when adducing an individual's educational background and previous employment experience, the personal biases of the evaluator do
not influence her evaluation of such traits. Thus, objective qualifications are readily comparable, and courts can easily determine the
more objectively qualified individual. In contrast, personal biases
do affect the evaluation of subjective traits, such as leadership
abilities and interpersonal skills. Reasonable people may differ in
their comparison of two individuals with respect to subjective
characteristics.
Those who favor a comparison of objective and subjective qualifications at the prima facie stage argue that employment decisions
rarely rely on purely objective comparisons among individuals but
also require an assessment of subjective characteristics, such as interpersonal skills and leadership abilities. Thus, a judicial evaluation of relative qualifications that ignores subjective traits does not
parallel real-life decisionmaking and therefore cannot as accurately
88. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994). In hiring, firing, and promotion cases, the courts remain
split over whether the plaintiff meets her prima facie burden simply by demonstrating that
she possessed the minimum qualifications required by the position or whether the plaintiff
must demonstrate that she possessed substantially equivalent qualifications relative to the
individual subsequently hired or promoted. Compare Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 656
F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring only that the plaintiff meet the employer's minimum requirements) and Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 347-48 (lOth Cir. 1975)
(same) with Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring substantially equivalent qualifications) and United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,
534 F.2d 805, 814 (8th Cir. 1976) (same) and Oliver v. Moberly Mo. Sch. Dist., 427 F. Supp.
82,86 (E.D. Mo.1977) (same). Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve
this issue in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, it chose not to do so.
See 460 U.S. 711 (1983). In Aikens, a promotion case, the D.C. Circuit overruled the district
court's conclusion that the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was more qualified than other
individuals promoted by the defendant. See Aikens v. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 642 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
89. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
90. See 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case ... is not
onerous.").
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assess which of two individuals is more qualified.91 However, two
practical considerations weigh heavily on the side of focusing exclusively on objective qualifications at the prima facie stage.
First, to require plaintiffs to obtain evidence of their own subjective qualifications, as well as those of the retained employee(s),
places too onerous a burden upon plaintiffs. The personal observations of supervisors or co-workers may be the only evidence available with respect to subjective characteristics such as motivation,
leadership abilities, and interpersonal skills. Plaintiffs, if required
to demonstrate superior subjective qualifications, would have to
spend considerable time and effort interviewing and deposing supervisors and co-workers. Moreover, both conscious and unconscious prejudices may color supervisors' and co-workers'
assessments of plaintiffs' subjective qualifications.92 One easily can
imagine a supervisor, believing that older people tend to be stodgy
and slow-witted, wrongly evaluating an older employee as inflexible
and slow to adapt to changes in the workplace. Alternatively, in
anticipation of a RIF, an employer purposely may give an older
worker a negative evaluation in order to justify her dismissal when
the RIF actually occurs.93 In such circumstances, a plaintiff will be
unable to establish a prima facie case because she cannot show that
she possessed equal or superior subjective qualifications relative to
the retained employee.
Second, in addition to the evidentiary difficulties of demonstrating relative subjective qualifications, the plaintiff may have to speculate as to which traits the employer most highly valued, identifying
all possible qualifications the employer may have considered. This
requirement places upon the plaintiff a very high burden. 94 The
employer, in contrast, has ready access to such information and easily can bear the burden of identifying the qualities it considered and
91. See, e.g., Aikens, 642 F.2d at 522 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
92. See Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expectancies,
46 J. Soc. IssuES 61,66-67 (1990); see also Lewis v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 691 F. Supp.
915, 919 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that evidence that less qualified engineering associates were
kept on at the facility is particularly hard to come by where layoffs are based on subjective
performance ratings that may have been influenced by bias); Mack A. Player, Applicants,

Applicants in the Hal~ Who's the Fairest of Them All? Comparing Qualifications Under Employment Discrimination Law, 46 OHio ST. L.J. 277,294 (1985).
93. For example, in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979), the plaintiff's
new supervisor moved to discharge the plaintiff, an international sales manager. The company's president blocked this action on the grounds that there was a lack of documentation to
support termination of the plaintiff and suggested that the plaintiff be given specific assignments so that his performance could be evaluated better. The plaintiff's responsibilities were
changed, and he became area manager of Latin America. The supervisor fired the plaintiff a
few months later on the grounds that he had not generated enough business in Latin America
to justify his salary, noting "involuntary termination- poor job performance" on plaintiff's
personnel records. 600 F.2d at 1008.
94. See Player, supra note 92, at 289.
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the manner in which it assessed those qualities as, between the
plaintiff and the retained employee.95 Hence, it makes more sense
to put this burden on the employer at stage two, rather than on the
employee at the prima facie stage.
Arguably, the discovery process provides the plaintiff with the
means by which to discover the qualifications most highly valued by
the employer, thereby eliminating the necessity of shifting the burden of production to the employer. This argument, however, ignores the realities of employment discrimination litigation. First, in
response to an interrogatory asking the employer to explain its
decisionmaking process, the employer has little incentive to be
completely forthcoming in its answer and may offer the plaintiff
only vague explanations.96 In contrast, defendants, in all likelihood,
will explain in some detail their selection process during stage two
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.97 Although
technically the employer need do no more than articulate a legitimate reason for its decision,98 the fear that the factfinder will believe the plaintiff should the employer make only a minimal
showing will motivate the employer to present detailed evidence.99
Second, employers have an incentive to offer misleading or dishonest responses to plaintiffs' interrogatory requests. For example,
suppose the plaintiff demonstrated superior leadership potential
while the retained employee possessed better organization skills,
and the employer was aware of their respective abilities. If in answer to the interrogatory, the employer states that it values organizational skills over leadership potential, the plaintiff will be unable
to establish a prima facie case. The employer thus has an incentive
to emphasize organizational skills over leadership skills, regardless
of whether it truly values the retained employees' strengths more
than it values the plaintiff's strengths, in order to thwart the plaintiff's attempt to establish a prima facie case. Consequently, if
courts require plaintiffs to prove that they possessed equivalent
subjective as well as objective qualifications relative to the retained
employee(s), many plaintiffs will be unable to establish a prima fa95. See Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1985); Bartholet,
supra note 27, at 1211-12; cf. Player, supra note 92, at 289 ("[R]equiring the employer to
articulate the precise reason it selected a particular person when confronted with a choice
between two objectively qualified candidates is logical and relatively easy.").
96. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1216; Player, supra note 92, at 289.
97. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1217.
98. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating
that the defendant's burden is to produce evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and not to persuade the court
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason).
99. See Bartholet, supra note 27, at 1217.
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cie case and will be denied a fair opportunity to show that age animus motivated their employer's actions.1oo
Arguably, a- showing that the plaintiff possessed equal or superior objective and subjective qualifications relative to the retained
employee supports a stronger inference of discrimination than
where the plaintiff only shows equal or superior objective qualifications. However, in light of the practical difficulties in demonstrating subjective qualifications, fairness to the plaintiff requires
ignoring subjective qualifications until the pretext stage of the analysis. Moreover, by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate equivalent
objective qualifications to the retained employee(s), courts can dismiss those cases where plaintiffs are clearly less qualified than the
retained employee(s).l01 Courts thus can protect adequately employers from having to defend themselves against frivolous claims, a
primary purpose of the prima facie case.1oz
CoNCLUSION

Employers will continue to lay off older workers as they restructure and reduce the size of their workforce in response to increased
global competition. Many discharged workers over the age of forty
will challenge their employer's decision under the ADEA. Some
approaches currently taken by the courts in RIF cases, however,
have not given due consideration to the interests of employers in
avoiding frivolous litigation. Employers who must streamline their
production often cannot afford the litigation costs of defending
against frivolous lawsuits. Consequently, if the prima facie case for
RIF discrimination cases does not offer employers adequate protection from such lawsuits, many personnel choices unfortunately may
be based on fears of litigation, rather than ability. On the other
hand, some employers impermissibly will rely on age in deciding
100. When a plaintiff cannot show equivalent objective qualifications, she may want to
establish an inference of discrimination and thus a prima facie case, by showing pretext. Specifically, the plaintiff may wish to support an inference of discrimination by presenting
pretextual evidence which suggests that either age bias or deceit entered into an employer's
assessment of her performance. Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek to show pretext by challenging the employer's articulation of its selection criteria. In essence, the plaintiff will want
to follow the Williams approach. However, as discussed supra section II.B, this approach
poses numerous difficulties.
101. Because of the evidentiary difficulties faced by the plaintiff in showing subjective
qualifications, the hurdle faced by plaintiffs at the prima facie stage should require only that
plaintiffs show that they possessed equivalent or superior objective qualifications to the retained employee(s). However, in those rare cases where the plaintiff does not possess
equivalent or superior objective qualifications but can manage to overcome the higher evidentiary hurdle of showing clearly superior subjective qualifications, the courts should adjust
the prima facie case and examine both subjective and objective qualifications.
102. See Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating
that the prima facie case serves to screen out unsubstantiated claims, thereby sparing the
employer unnecessary litigation expense).
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which employees to lay off. We cannot set the prima facie standard
so high as to render the ADEA meaningless. The challenge, therefore, is to set a standard in the RIF context that offers employers
protection against frivolous lawsuits while, at the same time, offering relief to those who have been discriminated against.
Accordingly, this Note has argued that courts should require
plaintiffs, as part of their prima facie burden, to 1) show that the
employer had a continuing need for the work previously performed
by the plaintiff, and 2) present evidence demonstrating that the
plaintiff possessed substantially equivalent objective qualifications
relative to younger employees retained by the employer. This
prima facie burden protects employers from having to defend themselves against frivolous claims. At the same time, this approach
also accomplishes the primary goal of the ADEA by ensuring that
those RIF plaintiffs with legitimate claims are given a fair opportunity to demonstrate that discriminatory action was taken against
them.

